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term "maintenance" as used in the wetland statute. The court
determined that maintenance, as used in the statute, means "keeping
something in a state of repair or efficiency." This, the court said,
suggested a functional baseline condition; in this instance, a road
above the water line.
Next, the court examined the meaning of "reconstruction" as used
in the statute. Here the court determined that, while reconstruction
differs from maintenance, there is an overlap in their meanings. The
court noted that reconstruction generally requires the nonexistence of
the object being rebuilt. However, because both words can mean
"repair," and, because the road was merely submerged, not
nonexistent, even if the fill work was reconstruction it was
reconstruction in the repair sense of the word.
Finally, the court noted that because the statute contains no
requirement that the road be serviceable, "the legislature's intention
was to treat farm roads differently from other roads." Serviceability,
the court determined, was not the distinguishing factor under the law.
Based on the legislative record, the court concluded that maintenance
as used in the statute included restoration to the "previously sound
and efficacious condition ...that [had] recently been lost."
Accordingly, the court reversed the DSL final decision.
Jeff Gillio

TEXAS
City of San Marcos v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. 03-0200724-CV, 2003 WL 22024663 (Tex. App. Aug. 29, 2003) (holding
discharged effluent lost its distinguishable qualities when commingled

with the San Marcos River, therefore becoming part of the river
watercourse).
San Marcos River Foundation and Dr. Jack Fairchild
("Foundation") appealed the district court's ruling to uphold the
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality's ("Commission")
decision granting the City of San Marcos ("City") a permit to convey
discharged wastewater effluent in the San Marcos River and then to
divert water from the river three miles downstream from the discharge
point. At the time of the controversy in question, Texas Code
required that no person appropriate or divert state water without first
obtaining a permit from the Commission. The City, believing it only
used the river as a vehicle to transport its privately owned water and
thus did not use state water, did not seek an appropriation permit in

their original application.
In 1997, while the City's original
application was still pending, the Texas Legislature passed the
comprehensive statewide water plan known as Senate Bill 1. Although
the Bill related directly to the types of reuse allowed in Texas, all
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parties agreed the Bill's grandfather clause rendered it inapplicable.
Because the Texas Code did not explicitly provide for the type of
permit the City applied for, the Commission determined it had
authority to decide the legal character of the water, and then
determined that the water remained privately owned by the City
throughout the transportation process. The Foundation appealed the
Commission's determination to the Texas Court of Appeals, believing
that once the City discharged the effluent, the water became state
water and thus the City needed an appropriation permit to divert. The
issue of whether an appropriation permit was needed to divert water
three miles downstream from the point of discharge hinged on
whether, once discharged, the effluent remained private property of
the City not needing a permit or became state water needing a permit.
The court noted the rule of capture governs Texas law regarding
ownership of property. A landowner may dig in her land, capturing as
much water as she chooses, without regard to downstream water rights.
Texas law further categorizes surface water into two categories: diffuse
surface water and water in a watercourse. Diffuse surface water
belongs to the landowner on which it is found, as long as the water is
gathered before it reaches a watercourse. On the other hand, water in
a watercourse belongs to the State, and is held in a trust for the public.
The court declared San Marcos River a watercourse.
Relying on City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton and Denis v.
Kickapoo Land Co., the City and Commission argued that the rule of
capture included the right to convey captured water down a
watercourse and later divert that same water, if the City clearly
However, the court
intended to reuse the discharged effluent.
concluded this reliance was misplaced, as both cases were decided on
different issues. The court in Corpus Christi held that a private owner
has the right to transport captured groundwater to 'the place of use.'
In the present case, the court noted the City was not transporting the
effluent to 'the place of use,' but rather to a new water treatment plant
three miles downstream where it would be treated and then sent to
'the place of use.' By allowing the effluent to travel three miles
downstream, the discharged effluent mixes with the cleaner river water
and loses its independent characteristics. Thus, at the point of
diversion, the released effluent is no longer differentiable from the
river water. Because the City's cleansing program relied on this
mixing process as part of their water treatment program, the court
found the discharge was not intended solely for transportation, but
largely for cleaning.
The court further concluded that because the effluent was defined
as municipal waste, which is not within the Texas Code's definition of
water, the effluent was not fungible with the river water. The court
held that by intentionally discharging their effluent into the river,
where it lost its independent characteristics and became part of the
river, the City abandoned the water as a matter of law. The court
found the common-law right to transport must be based on physical
control rather than subjective intent to maintain control.
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Because the effluent was not fungible with the river water, the
court reversed the district court's conclusion, holding that the effluent
became state water once discharged into the San Marcos River. Unless
the owner of the effluent can identify the effluent in the watercourse
and divert it before it commingles with the state water, the water is
presumed to become the watercourse. Therefore the court found if
the City wishes to reuse water, it must do so within the framework of
Senate Bill 1.
Aimee Wagstaff

Watts v. State, No. 14-99-00811-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 6396 (Tex.
App. July 24, 2003) (holding trial court's improper instruction and
taking ofjudicial notice as to whether waters in drainage ditch were
waters of the State constituted harmless error where jury could not
reasonably reach a different conclusion than the instruction).
The State of Texas charged John Watts with water pollution, a
misdemeanor. A jury sitting for the Fifteenth County Criminal Court
in Harris County found Watts guilty. The Fourteenth District Court of
Appeals affirmed Watt's conviction. However, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction based on a jury instruction
given by the trialjudge. The appellate court then remanded the case
to the intermediate court of appeals to apply the harmless error rule to
the trial judge's instruction. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth
District then found the Judge's instruction harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The State prosecuted Watts for discharging sewage within 150 feet
of a drainage ditch. The Texas criminal water pollution statute
provided that knowing discharges into or adjacent to "waters in the
state" constituted a misdemeanor offense. Therefore, the critical issue
regarding Watts' guilt was whether water in the drainage ditch
constituted "waters in the state." The trial court took judicial notice of
American PlantFood, a past Texas Court of Appeals case, and instructed
the jury that water in a drainage ditch was "waters in the state." On
appeal, Watts argued this instruction deprived him of his right to ajury
trial regarding an essential question of fact.
The court reviewed the instruction and held beyond a reasonable
doubt that the instruction did not contribute to the conviction. The
court reasoned that the instruction was harmless error because no
juror could have reasonably interpreted the water pollution statute so
that the broad and inclusive term, "waters in the state," would not
include water in a drainage ditch located in the state. The court also
rejected Watts' argument that the trial judge's instruction that the
drainage ditch was a type of surface water the legislature meant to
protect under the statute prejudiced Watts because the instruction
should have regarded water in the drainage ditch and not the drainage
ditch itself. The court reasoned that water must be in the ditch by

